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Abstract
Government ownership may dominate private ownership under government failure. Such dom-
inance disappears as product markets grow mature, giving rise to the need for privatization.
Buyers' limited wealth imposes a constraint on how and when privatization takes place. In
particular, ¯rms may be underpriced during privatization, and privatization may take place
at a sub-optimal timing which results in ¯rm performances to deteriorate in the short run,
and to improve only in the long run. Partial privatization may alleviate the constraint in
some cases but exacerbates the e±ciency loss in others. When the government is lesser an
interventionist or when the product market grows mature very rapidly, privatization is likely
to take place at a sub-optimal timing. The analysis is applied to the dynamics of the Chinese
non-state sector.
Keywords: government rent seeking, government ownership, privatization
JEL Classi¯cation: P30, L20, K40
¤I would like to thank the Center for International Business and Economics Research (College of Business)
and the Center for East Asian and Paci¯c Studies at the University of Illinois for ¯nancial support. I started
the project when I was visiting Euro Asia Center, INSEAD to which I am grateful for providing me a wonderful
research facility. I have bene¯ted from seminar participants at INSEAD and the University of Illinois, Loren
Brandt, Giovanni Fachinni, Hongbin Li, Wei Li, and George Pinteris for their useful comments.
11 Introduction
Recent decades have seen a wave of privatization sweeping around the world. This policy
trend opens up fresh perspectives regarding government ownership. Market failure is no
longer viewed as a reason that automatically warrants government ownership. Increasingly,
government failure is being considered as a major factor that renders government ownership
undesirable (Shleifer 1998, World Bank 1995).
However, just as market failure does not automatically warrant government ownership,
government failure does not automatically warrant private ownership either. The point of
departure of this paper is to demonstrate a trade-o® between government and private own-
ership under government failure, and how the nature of this trade-o® is determined by the
extent of market failure. Based upon this normative analysis, the paper examines how pri-
vatization takes place in equilibrium as a result of market development, with a focus on the
impact of buyers' wealth constraints. This analysis allows a number of issues pertinent to
the privatization literature to be addressed in a coherent framework. These issues include:
whether privatization improves ¯rm performances, why ¯rms are underpriced during priva-
tization, and whether partial privatization is a \second best" instrument in the presence of
wealth constraints.
A few caveats are necessary to put this analysis in perspective. The question of whether,
or perhaps more precisely, under what conditions, private ownership is more e±cient than
government ownership is a complicated one. So are issues concerning privatization. Answers
to these questions depend on the particular institutional environment, as well as ¯rm charac-
teristics with regard to which these questions are placed; and there ought to be no analysis
that is \one-size-¯ts-all". My analysis in this paper makes special reference to transition
from central planning to market economy. Within this context, the institutional assumptions
adopted in this paper concerning government failure, buyers' wealth constraints, and markets
that are gradually evolving seem to be ¯tting.
My analysis is carried out in two integral parts. The ¯rst part highlights the aforemen-
tioned trade-o® in a static model. In this model, a ¯rm is represented by an investment project
that relies on e®orts from a private agent, referred to as a manager, and an intermediate prod-
uct controlled by a government agency. Government failure takes the form of a rent seeking
activity by the corrupt government agency. Using its control of the intermediate product,
the government agency tries to extract rents from the manager once the manager's e®ort is
sunk, creating a standard hold-up problem (Grossman and Hart 1986 and Hart and Moore
1990). The severity of this hold-up problem depends in part upon the manager's ability to
¯nd substitutes for the intermediate product on a product market. This ability is determined
by the the extent of market failure, modelled in this paper as a search-type friction.
I show that, by subjecting the ¯nancial interests of the government agency to the ¯rm,
1government ownership induces the government agency to self-restrain its rent seeking activ-
ity. As a result, government ownership may improve the manager's incentive. I refer to this
as the commitment e®ect of government ownership. Government ownership also allows the
government agency to advance its own political interests by intervening in the business op-
eration of the ¯rm (Shleifer and Vishny 1994 and Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1996). This
distortional e®ect and the commitment e®ect constitute the trade-o® between government
ownership and private ownership. The extend of market failure a®ects the manager's outside
option, which in turn determines the nature of this trade-o®. In particular, government own-
ership dominates private ownership when the product market is heavily underdeveloped, and
yet such dominance disappears and private ownership becomes more e±cient as the market
grows mature.
This part of my analysis is closely related to Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Boycko,
Shleifer and Vishny (1996), which highlight the bene¯t of private ownership under government
failure. According to these authors, private ownership helps prevent the government from
interfering with the operation of the ¯rm. They assume implicitly that the ¯rm can operate
e±ciently without the presence of the government. In contrast, this paper considers an
environment where the market is highly underdeveloped and the ¯rm cannot operate without
the government agency providing inputs under their control.
Che and Qian (1998b) makes a similar argument that (local) government ownership may
dominate private ownership under government failure. In that paper, government failure takes
the form of state predation and as a result property rights are fundamentally insecure. In
this paper, government failure takes the form of government rent seeking whereas property
rights remain secure. In that paper, the state restrains itself from predation when the ¯rm is
owned by a third party: a local government. In this paper, the government agency restrains
itself from rent seeking when the ¯rm is owned by itself.
The commitment e®ect of government ownership di®ers from the standard prediction in
the property rights literature (Grossman and Hart 1986 and Hart and Moore 1990). The
standard prediction suggests that allocating ownership rights to a party increases the party's
bargaining power. This paper assumes that the government agency has no productive role
in the ¯rm. However, because of this commitment e®ect, government ownership reduces the
willingness of the government agency to exercise its bargaining power. As a result, allocating
ownership rights away from the party whose e®ort is crucial to the investment (i.e., the
manager) can actually enhance the latter's incentive.1
The second part of my analysis extends the static model into a dynamic one where the
1This observation is reminiscent to Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998). Di®erent from Chiu
(1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998), it is derived from an argument based on the fact that ownership
form can change the information value (without changing the information structure). See the next section for
a more detailed discussion.
2product market matures overtime (exogenously). My analysis focuses on how privatization
takes place endogenously in response to the product market development. By integrating the
normative and the positive aspects of privatization, this paper avoids the typical assumption
that government ownership is less e±cient and privatization is a must, and is able to compare
the equilibrium timing of privatization with the optimal timing of privatization, a comparison
that is essential for what this paper sets out to address.
I limit my discussion to insider-privatization, that is, privatization to the manager in the
context of this paper. Such a focus may be rationalized in the context of small-medium sized
¯rms, where empowering insiders, in particular the management, and stemming government
intervention rather than infusing fresh capital have been the major drive for privatization.
With reference to transition economies, I emphasize buyers' (i.e., the manager's) limited
wealth as one of the major constraints during privatization (Bolton and Roland 1992 and
Roland 2000).
Following the ¯rst part of my analysis, I characterize how payo®s for both the manager and
the government agency under the two ownership forms evolve along with the product market
development. Privatization takes place when the government agency and the manager, who
is wealth constrained, reaches an agreement through bargaining. To entertain a conventional
wisdom that partial privatization is the \second best" instrument in dealing with the wealth
constraint, I also di®erentiate privatization into full and partial. Under full privatization,
the government agency relinquishes both control and its share of investment returns; whereas
under partial privatization, the government agency maintains its share of investment returns.
I present three main results in this part of my analysis. My ¯rst result corresponds to
an intensive debate in the privatization literature: Does privatization improve ¯rm perfor-
mance? Surveying existing empirical works, Bevan, Estrin, and Scha®er (1999) suggests that
there is no systematically signi¯cant e®ect of privatization on performance; while Djankov,
Simeon and Peter Murrell (2002) feels con¯dent that privatization improves performance.
Meanwhile, the dubious post-privatization performance has been attributed to various pol-
icy failures during privatization, especially the lack of in-depth institutional reforms (Aghion
and Blanchard 1998, Debande and Friebel 1999, Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs 2001). I show that
when the manager's wealth constraint is binding at the optimal timing of privatization, pri-
vatization will take place prematurely, that is, before the product market development has
reached a state that private ownership dominates government ownership. Consequently, as
a transitory phenomenon in equilibrium, the ¯rm performance may deteriorate immediately
after privatization, but will improve in the long run as the product market develops further.
My reasoning thus complements the argument that lack of institutional reform is to blame for
the performance shortfall. On the one hand, the post-privatization performance deterioration
happens because privatization takes place before the product market matures. On the other
hand, my analysis also shows that, even with in-depth institutional reform coming in the
3future, a rent-seeking minded government may still strategically privatize the ¯rm before the
reform is in place.
The second result of my privatization analysis relates the manager's wealth constraint
to the underpricing phenomenon. In the privatization literature that relates to economic
transition, underpricing is typically referred to as a phenomenon in share-issue privatization,
typically to outsiders. There are two main arguments in this literature. One is a political
economy argument advanced by Biais and Perotti (2002), suggesting that underpricing helps
create a large political base to avoid any post-privatization expropriation (Schmidt 2000). The
other is an information argument o®ered by Bolton, Pivetta, and Roland (1997), according
to which underpricing (along with partial privatization) can be used to sort out new owners'
ability in managing the ¯rm. Focusing on insider privatization, this paper provides an alter-
native explanation for underpricing.2 In this paper, underpricing is de¯ned as the sale price of
the ¯rm not exhausting neither the manager's ability nor his willingness to pay. I show that,
when the manager's wealth constraint is binding o®-equilibrium, the bargaining power of the
government agency will be weakened in equilibrium, which in turn leads to underpricing.
My third result concerns the e±ciency implication of partial privatization. In the pres-
ence of buyers' wealth constraints, partial privatization is a natural candidate as a policy
instrument to circumvent such constraints (Bolton and Roland 1992 and Roland 2000). Fur-
thermore, the existing literature has shown that partial privatization can help overcome var-
ious constraints in addition to buyers' limited wealth.3 Partial privatization appears to be a
\second best" instrument in dealing with these constraints during privatization. My analysis
re-evaluates the impact of partial privatization within the context of buyers' wealth con-
straints. By allowing the government agency to choose between full and partial privatization,
I show partial privatization as \a double-edged sward". On the one hand, partial privati-
zation helps enhance the government agency's stake in ownership transformation, thus may
help relieve the constraint imposed by the manager's limited wealth. However, the possibility
to partially privatize the ¯rm also shifts the government agency's threat point during full
privatization. It therefore also helps enhance the government agency's bargaining power and,
in the presence of the manager's wealth constraint, induces the government agency to distort
both the timing and the method of privatization. My analysis thus serves as a cautionary
reminder that partial privatization may exacerbate rather than reduce e±ciency loss caused
by buyers' limited wealth during privatization.
2In the case of privatizing small and medium-sized enterprises to ¯rm insiders, which often times are
initiated by local governments in a decentralized fashion (see Cao, Qian, and Weingast 1999 for the account of
China), the political economy concern and the problem of information asymmetry are arguably less prominent
than in the case of large-scale privatization, typically carried out by the central government.
3For instance, Perotti (1995) argues that partial privatization can help build political con¯dence in reform,
Demougin and Sinn (1994) suggests that it o®ers risk-sharing, and Bolton, Pivetta, and Roland (1997) proposes
partial privatization (along with underpricing) as a sorting mechanism to overcome information asymmetry
in privatization.
4The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the static model and
the trade-o® between government and private ownership is analyzed in section 3. In section
4, I traces out how the payo®s for the government agency and the manager evolve along with
the product market development. This analysis allows me to identify the optimal timing
of privatization. In the subsequent two sections, I analyze how privatization takes place
in equilibrium when the manager has limited wealth. I begin with the case where partial
privatization is not an option for the government agency. I use this case to examine the issue
of underpricing and the relation between privatization and ¯rm performance. I then proceed
with the case where the government agency can choose between full and partial privatization
and demonstrate why partial privatization may exacerbate e±ciency loss. In the concluding
section, I relate my analysis to the case of China and discuss how this paper, both in terms of
its assumptions and its analysis, ¯ts the experience of China over the recent years. Additional
results and some possible extensions are discussed as well.
2 The Baseline Model
The baseline model is static and involves one period only. There are two risk-neutral agents
in this model: a manager of a ¯rm and a government agency. The ¯rm is characterized as an
investment project that requires an intermediate product and e®orts from the manager, both
ex ante and ex post, that is, both before and after the intermediate product is acquired. The
ex ante e®ort helps launch the project and the ex post e®ort helps complete it. I denote by e
the level of the ex ante e®ort, where e 2 [0;1], and by a the level of the ex post e®ort, where
a 2 [0;1]. The costs of these e®orts are denoted by c(e) and c(a) respectively.
The investment is launched with probability e after the ex ante e®ort is undertaken. Once
launched, the investment needs the intermediate product in place in order to continue. The
product, which cannot be acquired before the investment is launched (perhaps because of
unknown investment speci¯cs), is subject to government regulation. Under the regulation,
the government agency is charged with the authority to allocate the product at a regulated
price normalized to zero. However, the government agency is corrupt, it uses its authority to
illicitly collect a fee, B. In particular, after the investment has been initiated, the government
agency makes a take-it-or-leave-it o®er to the manager to pay B, where B 2 (¡1;1), or the
product will not be allocated. I allow the fee to be negative as the government agency may
o®er the manager a subsidy instead of charging him the fee.4 If the product is not allocated,
the manager will approach an product market to acquire a perfect substitute at a price that
is normalized to zero as well. The market is underdeveloped in the sense that the manager is
4I assume that, in the case of a subsidy, the government agency has a su±cient large ¯scal budget. Che
(2002) analyzes the implication when the government agency has a small ¯scal budget.
5able to acquire the substitute with probability ¹ and with probability 1 ¡ ¹, the investment
has to be terminated because of the lack of the intermediate product.
If completed, the investment generates a return. The expected value of this return depends,
among other things, on the product allocation. I denote by R1 this expected value when the
government-regulated product is allocated, and denote by R0 when the substitute is used in
the investment. The return on investment is not contractable and as a result, its claim depends
on ownership structure. I consider two kinds of ownership structures: private ownership where
the manager has the claim, and government ownership where the government agency and the
manager shares the return.5 For simplicity, I do not endogenize the share, but assume instead
that the government receives a share of 1 ¡ ¸ and the manager receives ¸.6 The ownership
form cannot be altered during the course of the investment.
The government agency can be of the following two types: one with a laissez-faire attitude
towards the ¯rm, or one that is an interventionist. At the beginning of the period, Nature
draws the type and reveals to the government agency but never to the manager. I assume that
the government agency's type bears no e®ect on the investment when the ¯rm is privately
owned, but has an impact on both the investment return as well as the productivity of the
manager's ex post e®ort. In particular, denote by µ (µ 2 fµh;µ1g) the government agency's
type, µ = µh when the government agency holds a laissez-faire attitude, and µ = µl vice versa.
The a priori belief of the manager is that µ = µh with probability of ° and µ = µl with
probability 1¡°. Let Ri = Ri(ajµ) denote the expected value of the investment return under
government ownership and by Ri = Ri(a) the expected value under private ownership. The
subscript i, where i 2 f0;1g, indicates whether the product is allocated by the government
agency (i = 1) or acquired from the market (i = 0).
Assumption 1 1) Ri(a) ¸ Ri(ajµh) > Ri(ajµl) for i 2 f0;1g;
2) @Ri
@a ¸
@Ri(µh)
@a >
@Ri(µl)
@a for i 2 f0;1g;
3) R1(ajµh) ¡ R0(ajµh) ¸ R1(ajµl) ¡ R0(ajµl); and
4) R1(ajµ) ¡ R0(ajµ) is non-decreasing in a for µ 2 fµh;µ1g:
Assumption 1 formalizes the notion that the government agency has no productive role
in the ¯rm (R(a) ¸ R(ajµ) for any µ),7 and that the interventionist type reduces both the
5I assume for simplicity that the owner does not have control over from which source the product is
acquired. Relaxing this assumption does not change my qualitative results.
6The manager shares the investment return under government ownership because he has the technological
expertise necessary for the investment. One may endogenize these shares, using the framework of Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).
7Notice that allowing the government agency to have a productive role in the ¯rm will only strengthen
the case for government ownership. Maintaining the assumption of an unproductive government thus helps
sharpen my analysis.
6investment return and the marginal productivity of the manager as compared to the laissez-
faire type. Furthermore, it implies that the laissez-faire attitude complements to the use of the
government-regulated intermediate product, which also complements the ex post managerial
e®ort.
The story behind the characterization of the government agency's types as well as the
information asymmetry nature associated with these types can be told as follows. The gov-
ernment agency has its political agenda, such as maintaining high employment. However
excessive hiring by the ¯rm may reduce both its investment return and the productivity of
the manager's ex post e®ort. Private ownership helps prevent the government agency from
using the ¯rm to pursue its political agenda, whereas government ownership allows the gov-
ernment agency to interfere (Shleifer and Vishny 1994 and Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1996).
However, because government interference also hurts the ¯nancial interests of the government
agency as an owner under government ownership, the government agency must weigh in the
balance between its ¯nancial interest and its political agenda. Such a balance is often in°uence
by various political and economic factors the government agency faces. Many of these factors
°uctuate from time to time and are better known to the government than to the general
public, thus creating the information asymmetry as discussed before. It is worth mentioning
that my analysis stands, as long as the manager has slightest uncertainty concerning the
government agency's attitude towards the ¯rm.
While such information asymmetry persists under both government ownership and pri-
vate ownership, it matters only when the ¯rm is government owned. This is because the
government interference is unproductive and the government agency can interfere with the
investment operation under private ownership. In contrast, the government agency can use
its ownership right to interfere (i.e., to act upon its private information) under government
ownership. In other words, ownership form changes the value of information without changing
the structure of information.8 One way to formalize such a change in information value under
di®erent ownership forms is to introduce a non-contractable control decision exercisable only
by the owner of the ¯rm, as in Che (2002). To simplify the exposition, I choose a reduced
form presentation by assuming directly, as in Assumption 1, that µ is neutral under private
ownership but is not under government ownership.
The sequence of events in this baseline model is summarized as follows:
² Ownership of the ¯rm is determined.
8This feature di®erentiates this paper from earlier works that compare government ownership with private
ownership based on an information argument. For example, Schmidt (1996) argues that private ownership
reduces the amount of information that politicians have, and as a result leads to a reduction of subsidies to
the ¯rm. Li (1996) suggests that the reduction of information available to a local government may prevent
it from helping out the ¯rm when the political environment becomes unfavorable. Both papers assume that
the information structure changes under di®erent ownership forms. This paper builds on these two earlier
contributions but uses the assumption that information value instead of information structure changes under
di®erent ownership forms.
7² The manager chooses e to launch the investment and µ is revealed to the government agency.
² The intermediate product is needed for the investment, the government agency charges B for
the product.
² If the government agency does not allocate the product, a substitute is acquired from the
product market with probability ¹.
² The investment is terminated without the intermediate product or its substitute; otherwise the
manager chooses a to manage the investment.
² The investment return is realized and distributed according to the ownership form.
The ¯rst best outcome in the baseline model is de¯ned as a choice of fe;ag such that:
fe;ag = argmax
e;a e(R1(a) ¡ c(a)) ¡ c(e):
This outcome is implemented under private ownership if the government agency is not corrupt.
I now turn to the situation where the government agency is corrupt. I proceed my analysis
using sequential equilibrium as my solution concept, and I apply the intuitive criterion test
(Cho and Kreps (1987)) to eliminate the \unreasonable" sequential equilibria.
3 Government Ownership v.s. Private Ownership:
The Static Trade-O®
Under private ownership, the government agency extracts rents from the ¯rm solely based on
the fee it charges for the intermediate product. After the product is allocated, the manager
chooses the ex post e®ort, denoted by a
p
1, such that a
p
1 = argmax(R1(a)¡c(a)): Let w
p
1 denote
the resulting ex post payo® of the manager. Were the product not allocated, the manager
would acquire a substitute with probability ¹, following with an ex post e®ort, a
p
0, such that
a
p
0 = argmax(R0(a) ¡ c(a)): Let w
p
0 denote the manager's ex post payo® in this case. With
all the bargaining power, the government agency will charge the fee, Bp, that drives the
manager's ex post payo® down to his outside option ¹w
p
0, leaving the manager with zero rent.
In other words,
w
p
1 ´ R1(a
p
1) ¡ c(a
p
1) ¡ Bp = ¹w
p
0: (1)
Under government ownership, the choice of the ex post managerial e®ort depends on
the manager's posterior belief of the government type, which in turn depends on how the
government agency sets the fee. I denote by ½ the posterior belief that µ = µh: Once the
government-regulated product is allocated, the manager chooses the ex post e®ort a
g
1(½) such
that:
a
g
1(½) = argmax[½¸R1(ajµh) + (1 ¡ ½)¸R1(ajµl) ¡ c(a)]:
8Following part 2 of Assumption 1, a
g
1(½) is increasing in ½.
The government agency extracts rents from two sources under government ownership: its
share of the investment return and the fee for the product. Let Bg(µ) denote the fee charged
by the government agency of type µ. The ex post payo® of the µ type government agency is:
vg(a
g
1(½);Bg(µ)jµ) = (1 ¡ ¸)R1(a
g
1(½)jµ) + Bg(µ):
I can establish the following single-crossing property using part 2 of Assumption 1.
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then ¯xing any posterior belief ½, the government
agency's payo® vg(µ) ´ vg(a
g
1(½);Bg(µ)jµ) satis¯es the following single-crossing property:
@vg(µh)
@a
g
1
=
@vg(µh)
@Bg >
@vg(µl)
@a
g
1
=
@vg(µl)
@Bg :9
Lemma 1 implies that a laissez-faire type government agency ¯nds it marginally more
pro¯table to trade-o® a smaller fee for a better ex post managerial e®ort than a intervention-
ist type government agency does (because the managerial e®ort is more productive when the
government agency has a laissez-faire attitude). It further implies that there exists a sepa-
rating equilibrium where Bg(µh) < Bg(µl), which is also unique after the intuitive criterion
test.
Lemma 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 hold. There exists a separating equilibrium under
government ownership, where Bg(µh) < Bg(µl) and the equilibrium is unique.
The ex post managerial e®ort is more productive when the government agency has a
laissez-faire attitude. This, combined with the higher ex post managerial e®ort, implies that
the return on investment is larger when the government agency is a laissez-faire type. Given
that the ex post managerial e®ort, the laissez-faire attitude of the government agency, and
the government-regulated product are all complementary to each other (part 3 and 4 of
Assumption 1), more rents are appropriable by the government agency when it is laissez-faire
type than when it is an interventionist. Using the truth-telling constraint for the government
agency and the fact that Bg(µh) < Bg(µl), I can then conclude that the government agency
will not appropriate all the rents from the manager under government ownership, in particular
when it has a laissez-faire attitude.
Proposition 1 Under private ownership, the government agency always full exercises its
bargaining power and the manager never receives any rents. In contrast, suppose that As-
sumption 1 holds. Then under government ownership, the government agency does not fully
9All proofs, unless omitted, are relegated to the appendix.
9exercise its bargaining power when µ = µh and the manager receives a positive amount of
expected rents ex ante.
In comparison with private ownership, government ownership compromises the ex post
managerial incentive. The compromise comes from two sources. On the one hand, the in-
centive for the ex post managerial e®ort is diluted because the government agency shares the
investment return. And on the other hand, the productivity of the ex post managerial e®ort
may be hampered due to the government interference. Because of such distortional e®ect,
government ownership is dominated by private ownership ex post.
Nevertheless, as Proposition 1 suggests, government ownership may promote the ex ante
managerial incentive as it induces the government agency to restrain itself from rent seeking
activities when µ = µh. This is what I refer to as the ex ante commitment e®ect. Indeed, ex
ante the manager chooses the e®ort eg under government ownership so that
eg = argmax[e(°w
g
1(½ = 1) + (1 ¡ °)w
g
1(½ = 0)) ¡ c(e)]:;
whereas under private ownership, the manager chooses ep so that
ep = argmax(ew
p
1 ¡ c(e)) = argmax(e¹w
p
0 ¡ c(e)):
Clearly, eg > ep when ¹ is close to zero, that is, when the product market is highly underde-
veloped.
The analysis in this section thus highlights the potential trade-o® in government ownership
suggested in the Introduction. The exact nature of such a trade o® determines the optimal
ownership structure. The focus of the rest of my analysis is to understand how product market
development in°uences this trade-o® and hence the transformation of ownership form.
4 Product Market Development and Optimal Ownership
The optimal ownership form of the ¯rm maximizes the social surplus that the ¯rm generates.
Let Sp and Sg denote the social surplus generated in equilibrium under private ownership and
that under government ownership respectively. As argued in the previous section, government
ownership is dominated by private ownership ex post. Therefore, government ownership will
dominate private ownership only when government ownership signi¯cantly improves the ex
ante managerial incentives.
Lemma 3 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Government ownership dominates private own-
ership only if eg is su±ciently larger than ep.
10The product market development in°uences the ranking between government ownership
and private ownership through its impact on eg and ep. It bears no e®ect to the social surplus
generated after the government agency allocates the regulated product. As the next lemma
shows, the product market development helps ex ante managerial e®ort under private owner-
ship to catch up with that under private ownership provided that the following assumption
holds:
Assumption 2 d
3c
de3 ¸ 0:
Lemma 4 Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold. Then @e
p
@¹ > @e
g
@¹ if eg ¸ ep:
The intuition of Lemma 4, roughly speaking, is as follows. An improved product market
increases the expected return on investment had the ¯rm had to acquire a substitute from
this market. This increment is larger under private ownership because the ex post managerial
e®ort is higher under private ownership than under government ownership. Furthermore,
because the manager has the full claim to the investment return, this larger increment under
private ownership accrues entirely to the manager. In contrast, only a share of a smaller
increase in the investment return accrues to the manager under government ownership. As
a result, the value of the manager's outside option increases faster under private ownership
than under government ownership. This implies that, ceteris paribus, the development of the
product market tends to promote the ex ante managerial e®ort more intensively under private
ownership.
Lemma 4 implies that the ex ante managerial e®ort under private ownership, which is
smaller than the e®ort under government ownership when the product market is highly un-
derdeveloped, will eventually catch up with the latter. It further implies that, once it catches
up, the ex ante managerial e®ort under private ownership will not fall below that under
government ownership again with further market development.
Lemma 5 Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold. Then there exists a unique solution to equation
ep(¹) = eg(¹).
Together Lemma 5 and Lemma 3 suggest that the social surplus under private ownership
will eventually catch up with that under government ownership as well. Moreover, once it
catches up, the social surplus under private ownership will not fall below that under govern-
ment ownership again either, as I show in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold. There exists ¹s such that private owner-
ship is more e±cient than government ownership if and only if ¹ > ¹s.
Proposition 2 reveals the existence of a unique turning point in the process of the market
development, at which private ownership will begin to dominate government ownership once
11and for all. This point thus de¯nes the socially optimal timing for privatization. However,
will privatization actually take place at this particular point in equilibrium?
The way in which privatization takes place in equilibrium depends on, among other things,
the bargaining between the government agency and buyers of the ¯rm, i.e., the manager in
this paper. This bargaining, if frictionless, could lead to privatization at the socially optimal
timing. However, there are plenty reasons for such bargaining not to be frictionless, especially
in the transition economy context, and an obvious form of friction is the manager's limited
wealth. The rest of the paper will analyze the implication of the manager's wealth constraint
on how privatization takes place in equilibrium. To prepare for that analysis, I trace out how
the payo®s for both the government agency and the manager evolve with product market
development under the two ownership forms.
A number of observations can be obtained. First, the government agency becomes in
favor of private ownership prior to ¹s whereas the manager begins to prefer private ownership
after ¹s. To see this, notice that government ownership Pareto dominates private ownership
when ¹ = 0. In addition, denote by Wp(¹) and Wg(¹) the manager's ex ante payo® under
private ownership and that under government ownership respectively. Let V p(¹) and V g(¹)
represent the corresponding terms for the government agency. Using the envelope theorem,
one can show that Wg(¹) ¸ Wp(¹) if and only if eg(¹) ¸ ep(¹). Since private ownership
dominates government ownership ex post, it must be true that eg(¹s) > ep(¹s) (see Figure
7 in the proof of Lemma 3). This therefore implies that Wg(¹s) > W p(¹s), which in turn
implies that V g(¹s) < V p(¹s).
Second, further market development will not alter the manager's preference for private
ownership once he becomes in favor of private ownership. Such irreversibility is a product
of two e®ects. On the one hand, conditional on the investment being launched, the product
market development enhances the manager's outside option, and hence his payo®, more in-
tensely under private ownership than under government ownership. On the other hand, when
the manager is in favor of private ownership, ep(¹) ¸ eg(¹) according to Lemma 4. In other
words, the likelihood of the investment being launched is higher under private ownership as
well. Therefore, as described in the next lemma, the manager will be increasingly in favor of
private ownership as the product market further develops.
Lemma 6 Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold. Then Wp(¹) ¡ Wg(¹) is increasing in ¹ for
¹ such that Wp(¹) ¸ Wg(¹).
Third, the rent-seeking government agency eventually becomes in favor of government own-
ership again when the product market becomes highly developed, provided that the market
provides a close substitute to the intermediate product regulated by the government agency.
The intuition is straightforward. When the product market grows mature, the government
agency extracts little rent from the manager if the market provides a close substitute to the
12intermediate product regulated by the government agency. Government ownership, on the
other hand, allows it to continue to share the investment return. To simplify the discussion,
I assume for the rest of the paper that the product market o®ers a perfect substitute for the
government-regulated product.
The next proposition summarizes these observations, which are also illustrated in Figure
1.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumption 1 and 2 hold. There exists ¹
g
1, ¹m; and ¹
g
2 such
that ¹
g
1 > ¹s > ¹m > ¹
g
2 where:
a) the manager weakly prefers government ownership to private ownership if and only if
¹ · ¹m; and
b) the government agency weakly prefers government ownership to private ownership if ¹ · ¹
g
1
or ¹ ¸ ¹
g
2.
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Figure 1: Payo® Di®erences under Private and Government Ownership
Notice that, di®erent from what is claimed in Proposition 3, in Figure 1 the government
agency prefers government ownership to private ownership if and only if ¹ · ¹
g
1 or ¹ ¸ ¹
g
2.
In other words, once the product market matures to such a level that the government agency
turns to favor government ownership again, further market development will no longer change
its preference. This particular pattern holds under the following assumption, which is satis¯ed
for some fairly general cost function c(e) (such as a quadratic one, for example).
Assumption 3 V g(t) ¡ V p(t) is increasing in t for all t ¸ ts such that V g(t) > V p(t).
135 The Equilibrium Privatization
I am now ready to analyze how ownership transformation will actually take place in equilib-
rium. I begin my analysis with full privatization. The possibility of partial privatization will
be incorporated in section 6.
5.1 The extended model
To analyze how privatization takes place in equilibrium, I extend the baseline model as follows.
Time is continuous and has an in¯nite horizon. Each point of time is a period in the baseline
model. The government agency's type, µ is distributed identically and independently across
these periods. The manager is assumed to be indispensable for the ¯rm. Therefore, in each
period, the government agency has to deal with the same manager. To make my analysis
tractable, I assume that both the manager's strategy and that of the government agency
within a period are history independent. The government agency and the manager share
the same discount rate r. The product market becomes increasingly developed over time; a
process that is assumed to be exogenous and is characterized by ¹(t) where ¹(0) = 0 and
d¹
dt > 0 for ¹ < 1.
At each point in time, an ownership form is chosen for the investment taking place at the
point. As before, I assume that the ownership form cannot be altered until the investment is
completed, that is, until the next point in time. The change in ownership form is accompanied
by a transfer payment made either from the manager to the government agency or vice versa.
Using the fact that the social surplus under the two ownership forms cross only once (see
Proposition 2), I can show that ownership transformation takes place at most once:
Lemma 7 Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 holds. Then ownership transformation, if ever takes
place, takes place only once.
Recall that government ownership Pareto dominates private ownership when ¹ = 0. I
assume that the ¯rm indeed begins with government ownership at t = 0. Lemma 7 thus
implies that ownership transformation, if any, takes the form of privatization, and furthermore
privatization is irreversible once it does take place.
The government agency has all the bargaining power during privatization. In particular,
at any point of time, the government agency decides whether to privatize the ¯rm, and if so,
at what transfer payment, or price, denoted by sp(t). When sp(t) is positive, the amount is
made from the manager to the government agency, and is negative otherwise. The manager
can either accepts or rejects the government agency's o®er. If the o®er is rejected, government
ownership is maintained. And at the next point in time, the government agency has to decide
again whether to privatize and at what transfer payment.
14The bargaining over the ownership rights is subject to the wealth constraint faced by
the manager. I assume the price a®ordable by the manager at any point is bounded above
by s¤ ¸ 0. On the other hand, the government agency is not wealth constrained. Hence,
sp(t) 2 (¡1;s¤].10
5.2 The equilibrium conditions
De¯ne PDWp(t) (and PDV p(t)) as the long-term payo® for the manager (and for the gov-
ernment agency respectively) when the ¯rm is privately owned at t. In addition, denote by
PDWg(t;t0) (and PDV g(t;t0)) as the long-term payo® for the manager (and for the govern-
ment agency respectively) at t while privatization is to take place at t0 > t.
For privatization to be feasible at t, both the government agency and the manager must
¯nd it more desirable than never privatizing at all:
PDW p(t) ¡ sp(t) ¸ PDWg(t;1) for t 2 [0;1), and (2)
PDV p(t) + sp(t) ¸ PDV g(t;1) for t 2 [0;1): (3)
In addition, when privatization takes place at t, the manager must also be able to a®ord the
payment sp(t), i.e.,
sp(t) · s¤: (4)
Together, condition (2) and (3) imply that privatization will take place only if, from a
long-term perspective, private ownership Pareto dominates government ownership. De¯ne t0
as a point such that:
PDW p(t0) + PDV p(t0) = PDW g(t0;1) + PDV g(t0;1):
As I prove in the next lemma, t0 is the \starting point" that private ownership Pareto domi-
nates government ownership in the long run.
Lemma 8 There exists a price sp(t) that is a®ordable to the manager and satis¯es the par-
ticipation constraints (2) and (3) if and only if t 2 [t0;1) and
s¤ ¸ PDV g(t;1) ¡ PDV p(t): (5)
10The wealth constraint in this model is assumed to be time-invariant. More realistically, the manager
may accumulate wealth over time. However, endogenizing the wealth accumulation tremendously complicates
the analysis without adding signi¯cant insights. Alternatively, one may imagine that at each point in time,
the manager exogenously receive a small budget that allows him to add to his stock of wealth after paying
the fee to the government agency (consequently, there is no wealth constraint in acquiring the intermediate
product). The wealth constraint s¤ can then be modelled as an exogenous function of time. In this case, the
time-invariant assumption can be regarded as an approximation for the product market development being
much faster than the manager's wealth accumulation.
15Denote by te the timing at which privatization takes place in equilibrium. To privatize
the ¯rm at te, the government agency needs to make sure that the manager will not reject
sp(te), the price it o®ers and delay the privatization till future. That is,
PDW p(te) ¡ sp(te) ¸ PDW g(te;t0); for any t0 > te (6)
Notice, however, that the value of PDW g(te;t0) depends on sp(t0), the price the government
agency would o®er at t0 if the ¯rm had not been privatized by that time. Since the government
agency cannot pre-commit to a price at t0, sp(t0) must also satisfy an incentive compatibility
constraint similar to (6).
Denote by · sp(t) an incentive compatible price that satis¯es condition (6) (and hence
condition (2) as well) if privatization were to take place at t. At any point t, the government
agency, attempting to exercise its bargaining power, will choose the highest · sp(t). De¯ne ~ sp(t)
as the resulting maximum for t. ~ sp(t) is the subgame perfect price if privatization is to take
place at t.
In equilibrium, the government agency must neither want to privatize later than te:
PDV p(te) + ~ sp(te) ¸ PDV g(te;t0); (7)
for any t0 > te, nor earlier than te:
PDV p(t00) + ~ sp(t00) ¸ PDV g(t00;te); (8)
for any t00 < te.
A privatization equilibrium is therefore de¯ned as a stream of subgame perfect prices ~ sp(t)
for t 2 [t0;1) that satis¯es condition (3) and (4), and a subgame perfect equilibrium timing
of privatization te that satis¯es condition (7) and (8).
5.3 Type I and type II wealth constraint
In two ways the manager's limited wealth may a®ect how privatization takes place. On the
one hand, the manager may not have enough to compensate for the government agency for
the ownership rights it will relinquish, in which case privatization will not be feasible.
PDV g(t;1) ¡ PDV p(t) > s¤:
I refer to this situation as the wealth constraint being binding in type I at t. On the other
hand, the wealth constraint may also imply that the government agency cannot take full
advantage of its bargaining power, and as a result the willingness of the manager to pay for
16the ownership rights is not exhausted.
PDW p(t) ¡ PDW g(t;1) > s¤:
I refer to this second situation as the wealth constraint being binding in type II at t. When
the wealth constraint is binding in type II but not in type I at t, privatization is feasible at t
but the government agency is not able to extract all the gains from privatization.
The next lemma summarizes a number of useful observations with regard to these two
types of wealth constraints, which are further characterized in Figure 2.
Lemma 9 Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold. Then for t ¸ t0, the wealth constraint must
binding in
a) type II at t if it is binding in type I at t;
b) type II for t0 > t if it is binding in type II at t; and
c) type I for t0 > t when it is binding in type I at t ¸ ts, provided that Assumption 3 holds in
addition.
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Figure 2: Type I and II binding wealth constraint
In Figure 2, PDW p(t) ¡ PDW g(t;1) is increasing in t for t ¸ ts. Such monotonicity
is derived using the fact that Wp(ts) < W g(ts) and Lemma 6. The same pattern holds
for PDV g(t;1) ¡ PDV p(t) as well, and it results from the fact that V g(ts) > V p(ts) and
Assumption 3. PDW p(t) ¡ PDW g(t;1) > PDV g(t;1) ¡ PDV p(t) for t ¸ ts as ts > t0.
This ¯gure demonstrates a case where there exists a point beyond which privatization is no
longer feasible. I denote such an \end point" by t11. Naturally, t11 satis¯es the following
condition.
PDV g(t11;1) ¡ PDV p(t11) = s¤; (9)
17and privatization can take place at t only if t 2 [t0;t11].
The reason for introducing the type II constraint can be seen by considering the following
case. Suppose that the wealth constraint is never binding in type II for t ¸ ts. According to
part (a) of Lemma 9, this implies that the wealth constraint is never binding in type I for t ¸ ts
either. In this case, privatization will take place at the optimal timing ts in equilibrium and
the government agency will grab the entire gains from privatization. This is because at any
point after ts, it would always be optimal for the government agency to set the privatization
price sp(t) to exhaust its bargaining power, i.e., sp(t) = PDWp(t) ¡ PDW g(t : 1), should
privatization have not taken place by then. As a result, the manager would never be able to
capture any gains from privatization after ts and will therefore have no incentive to postpone
privatization, but to accept the government agency's privatization proposal at ts.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumption 1 and 2 hold. Suppose in addition that the wealth
constraint is never binding in type II for all t ¸ ts. Then
a) the equilibrium timing of privatization is e±cient: te = ts; and
b) the government agency receives all the gains from privatization.
The rest of this section focuses on scenarios where the wealth constraint is binding (either
in type I or in type II) for some t ¸ ts. Following part (a) of Lemma 9, I divide the analysis
into two subsections. The next subsection deals with the case when the wealth constraint is
not binding in type I at ts, but binding in type II at some t ¸ ts. In this case, privatization
is feasible at ts, and yet the government agency would become unable to extract all the gains
from privatization, if privatization were to take place after t. Then I consider the case where
the wealth constraint is binding in type I, and hence privatization is not feasible, at ts.
My analysis is designed to address the following two questions that have been studied
extensively in the literature: Will privatization improve ¯rm performance? Will the ¯rm be
underpriced during privatization, and why?
5.4 Underpricing and wealth constraint o®-equilibrium
Consider the ¯rst case ¯rst. In this case, privatization is feasible at ts, but the government
agency is unable to extract all the gains from privatization at some t ¸ ts had privatization
failed to take place by that time. Notice this case includes the possibility for the wealth
constraint to be not binding in type II at ts, which would imply that the ¯rm can be priced
to exhaust the manager's willingness to pay, if the ¯rm is privatized at the social optimal
timing. However, will the ¯rm be privatized at the social optimal timing? Will the ¯rm be
priced to exhaust the manager's willingness to pay?
When the wealth constraint becomes binding in type II, some gains from privatization
accrue to the manager. Anticipating this situation to arise in the future, the manager may
18try to postpone privatization. Such an attempt will then force the government agency to
reduce the price in order to \reward" the manager for agreeing to privatization today. This
is the intuition that drives the analysis for this particular case.
To begin, recall that a subgame perfect price ~ sp(t) must satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint (6) if privatization were to take place t. Combining (6) and the fact that the
government agency has all the bargaining power, I can show that a subgame perfect transfer
payment ~ sp(t) satis¯es the following di®erential equation:
d~ sp(t)
dt
= r~ sp(t) ¡ (Wp(t) ¡ Wg(t)):11 (10)
for t 2 [t0;t11].
When postponing privatization, the manager loses the marginal gain of privatization
Wp(t) ¡ Wg(t) but gains as he is able to discount the current privatization price r~ sp(t).
Equation (10) states that, in order for the manager to accept privatization at t, the privati-
zation price must change from point t in such away that it o®sets the manager's incentive to
postpone privatization.
Apparently, had the ¯rm not been privatized by t11, the government agency would price
the ¯rm at s¤, since further delay by the manager is no longer feasible. However, even prior
to t11, the government agency may choose to price at s¤ as well. Such a scenario arises when
the manager does not ¯nd it in his own interest to delay privatization, even if the government
agency prices the ¯rm at s¤ from that point on. I refer to this point as t12. According to
condition (10), t12 is given by:
Wp(t12) ¡ Wg(t12) = rs¤:
Following the fact that Wp(ts) < W g(ts) (see Proposition 3) and part (b) of Lemma 9, I have
t12 > ts. Combining these observations together, I can conclude that there exists a point,
denoted by t1, from that on the government agency would price the ¯rm at what the manager
could a®ord, had the ¯rm not been privatized. That is, t1 = minft11;t12g, and
~ sp(t1) = s¤: (11)
Because privatization is feasible at ts in the present case and because Wp(t)¡Wg(t) > 0 only
if t > ts, I have t1 > ts in this present case. Furthermore, since Wp(t) ¡ Wg(t) is increasing
11This equation is derived as follows. First, I can show that condition (6) holds for t 2 [t0;t11) only if
d~ sp(t)
dt ¸ r~ sp(t) ¡ (Wp(t) ¡ Wg(t)): Then using the fact that the government agency has all the bargaining
power, I set
d~ sp(t)
dt = r~ sp(t) ¡ (Wp(t) ¡ Wg(t)):
19in t when Wp(t) > W g(t) (see Lemma 6), t1 also has the property that
Wp(t1) ¡ Wg(t1) · rs¤: (12)
Using the transversality condition (11), I can solve the di®erential equation (10) and obtain
the entire stream of the subgame perfect prices ~ sp(t) for t 2 [t0;t1]:
~ sp(t) =
Z t1
t
e¡r(z¡t)(Wp(z) ¡ Wg(z))dz + e¡r(t1¡t)s¤: (13)
Substituting (13) into (10), and using Lemma 6 and condition (12), I can show that
d~ sp(t)
dt
> 0;
for t 2 (t0;t1). From the point of view of backward induction, such monotonicity demonstrates
a downward pressure on the transfer payment. That is, if the government agency wants to
privatize earlier, it must lower the current privatization price as compared to the privatization
price in the future.
This downward pressure implies that the wealth constraint, condition (4), must not be
binding for all t 2 [t0;t1). Furthermore, since PDW p(t) ¡ PDW g(t;1) > PDW p(t) ¡
PDWg(t;t0) for any t and t0 > t, the participation constraint for the manager, condition
(2), must not be binding either for all t 2 [t0;t1). Finally, I can show that ~ sp(t) satis¯es the
participation constraint (3) for all t 2 [ts;t1] as well.12 These observations combined together
imply that ~ sp(t) is both feasible and incentive compatible for the manager as long as the ¯rm
is not privatized prematurely, i.e., as long as te ¸ ts.
Will the ¯rm be privatized prematurely in this case? The answer is negative. To see this,
notice that in order to privatization to take place at te, condition (7) must be satis¯ed. With
some manipulation, I can reduce this condition to:
V g(te) ¡ V p(te) ¡ r~ s(te) +
d~ s(te)
dte · 0: (15)
12Di®erentiating PDV g(t;1) ¡ PDV p(t) with respect to t, I have:
@(PDV g(t;1) ¡ PDV p(t))
@t
= r(PDV g(t;1) ¡ PDV p(t)) ¡ (V g(t) ¡ V p(t)): (14)
Comparing (14) with (10) and given the fact Sp(t) ¡ Sg(t) > 0 for t > ts, I have the following single-crossing
property:
@(PDV g(t;1) ¡ PDV p(t))
@t
>
d~ sp(t)
dt
:
for t 2 [ts;t1] such that PDV g(t;1) ¡ PDV p(t) = ~ sp(t). This single-crossing property then implies, for
any t 2 [ts;t1], the incentive compatible transfer payment must be more than enough to compensate the
government agency for the ownership rights. That is, condition (3) is satis¯ed for t 2 [ts;t1].
20Substituting condition (10) into this condition, I have Sp(te) ¸ Sg(te); hence te ¸ ts. That
is, the ¯rm will never be privatized prior to the social optimal timing in the present case.
Will privatization take place after ts in equilibrium? The answer is no as well. Given that
none of the conditions (2), (3), and (4) is binding for t 2 [ts;t1), in order for privatization
to take place at te 2 (ts;t1), condition (8) must hold. As in the case of condition (7), this
condition can be reduced as
V g(te) ¡ V p(te) ¡ r~ s(te) +
d~ s(te)
dte ¸ 0: (16)
Combining (15) and (16) together, I have:
V g(te) ¡ V p(te) ¡ r~ s(te) +
d~ s(te)
dte = 0: (17)
Substituting condition (17) into condition (10), I have Sp(te) = Sg(te), which contradicts to
the assumption that te > ts.
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumption 1, 2, and 3 hold. Suppose in addition that the wealth
constraint is not binding in type I at ts, but is binding in type II for some t ¸ ts. Then
a) privatization takes place in equilibrium at the socially optimal timing, i.e., te = ts; and
b) the ¯rm is underpriced during privatization in the sense that ~ sp(te) < minfs¤;PDW p(te)¡
PDW g(te;1)g.
To illustrate Proposition 5, I present Figure 3, which by itself represents two scenarios:
one in which t1 = t12 (the upper panel) and the other scenario where t1 = t11 (the lower
panel). Notice that in both scenarios, the wealth constraint is not binding either in type I or
in type II at ts. The upper panel further suggests the possibility that the wealth constraint
is never binding in type I. It demonstrates that the government agency would always set the
privatization price ~ sp(t) = s¤ from t12. Prior to t12, however, the government agency has to
lower the privatization price in order to encourage the manager to agree to privatize earlier.
In equilibrium, privatization takes place at ts at a price that does not exhaust either the
manager's ability to pay s¤ or his willingness to pay PDW p(ts) ¡ PDW g(ts;1). The lower
panel tells a similar story.
Proposition 5 thus implies that the wealth constraint, when it is binding only along the o®-
equilibrium path (i.e, for t > ts), has a redistributive e®ect but no e±ciency e®ect. That is, the
¯rm will be privatized at ts and the ¯rm will be underpriced during privatization. One natural
question is whether the underpricing phenomenon, thus described, is robust. In particular, to
what extent does this result depend on the fact that in this model the ¯rm is privatized to a
single buyer? It turns out that the single buyer assumption is less restrictive than it appears.
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Figure 3: Underpricing when wealth constraint is binding o®-equilibrium
In fact, one can show that there can be underpricing in equilibrium, even when the ¯rm can
be privatized to anyone of ¯nitely many insiders that are all wealth constrained. Nonetheless,
the underpricing phenomenon will not emerge if the government agency could commit to a
strategy of \privatizing now or never". Yet it is not clear whether such commitment can be
credible. And aside from the issue of credibility, such a strategy may force privatization to
take place prematurely, a subject I discuss next.13
5.5 Does privatization improve ¯rm performance?
Together, Proposition 4 and 5 suggest that privatization will take place at the social optimal
point as long as privatization is feasible at that point. Next, consider the case where priva-
tization is not feasible at the social optimal point; that is, the wealth constraint is binding
in type I at ts. To relieve this constraint, the government agency may either postpone the
privatization or privatize prematurely. Following part (c) of Lemma 9, the wealth constraint is
binding in type I for all t > ts, implying that t11 < ts in this case. Accordingly, privatization
13One can show that, when the wealth constraint is binding in type II at ts, the strategy of \privatizing
now or never" will give rise the equilibrium timing te such that V g(te) ¡ V p(te) = rs¤.
22would be feasible only if the government agency privatizes the ¯rm prematurely.
Proposition 6 Suppose that Assumption 1, 2, and 3 hold. Suppose in addition that the
wealth constraint is binding in type I at ts. Then privatization, if it ever takes place, takes
place at t11.
Privatization will not take place prior to t11 because otherwise, both condition (10) and
(15) must be satis¯ed at te, which gives Sp(te) ¸ Sg(te), implying that te ¸ ts. This
contradicts to the fact that privatization is not feasible for t ¸ ts in this case. Proposition 6
suggests that, when the manager's limited wealth prevents privatization from taking place at
the optimal timing, privatization will not take place until the market development reaches a
point beyond which privatization is no longer feasible.
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Figure 4: Social surplus and premature privatization in equilibrium
Figure 4 illustrates how the social surplus generated by the ¯rm evolves over time in
this case. As the product market develops, the social surplus under government ownership
increases; at t11 < ts, privatization takes place, causing the social surplus to dip in the short
run. In the long run, however, the social surplus under private ownership surpasses that
of government ownership. In other words, the ¯rm exhibits J-curve-like post-privatization
performance.
This observation has a number of important empirical and policy implications. First, even
though private ownership dominates government ownership in the long run, it is possible to
observe privatized ¯rms to perform less e±ciently than government-owned ¯rms immediately
after privatization. How long a period of time over which a panel data is gathered is likely
to in°uence the conclusion of the empirical study concerning the relative performances of
privatized ¯rms.
Furthermore, it may be necessary to analyze not only the levels, but perhaps more im-
portantly, the trends of performance both before and after privatization in order to evaluate
23whether privatization improves ¯rm performance. For example, as Figure 4 indicates, the
performance under private ownership at ¿ catches up with the level of performance under
government ownership at t11. However, the performance of government ownership at this
particular point would continue to dominate that of private ownership, had the ¯rm not been
privatized. Since the potential performance under government ownership after privatization
is not observable, in order to reach a correct conclusion of whether privatization improves
¯rm performance at ¿, it is important to estimate the projected trend of ¯rm performance
under government ownership after ts. And to obtain a good estimate of such a trend, one
should use long-term performance data both prior to and after privatization.14
There has been mixed empirical evidence on the performance e®ect of privatization ,
especially in the context of transition economies (Bevan, Estrin, and Scha®er 1999 and Svejnar
2002). And the existing literature have attributed the disappointing record of privatization
to the lack of in-depth institutional reforms (Svejnar 2002, Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs 2001)
to safeguard problems such as asset stripping (Aghion, Blanchard and Burgess 1994), insider
entrenchment (Aghion and Blanchard 1998), and soft budget budget constraints (Debande
and Friebel 1997). This paper o®ers a complementary interpretation. According to my
analysis, privatization fails to improve the ¯rm performance in the short run because, when
privatization takes place, the product market has not matured to the state of ¹s. In this
regard, my analysis echoes the argument for in-depth institutional reforms. Meanwhile, my
analysis also suggests that the worsening performance could arise as a transitory phenomenon
in equilibrium. In particular, the rent-seeking minded government agency deliberately allows
privatization to take place prior to ts while anticipating the product market to grow mature in
the future. And exactly because the product market continues to evolve after privatization, the
deterioration in performance is only transitory. In other words, even with in-depth institutional
reform in place, it will still be possible for privatization to take place prematurely, leading to
the performance of a ¯rm to deteriorate in the short run.
Finally, this observation highlights a dynamic cost of government ownership that is not
present in the static analysis. Recall that there is a trade-o® between government ownership
and private ownership in the static model: government ownership helps create an ex ante
commitment e®ect while rendering the ¯rm less e±cient ex post. In a dynamic setting, gov-
ernment ownership also allows the government agency to reap gains from privatization. In the
presence of the manager' wealth constraint, such an attempt by the rent seeking government
agency leads to an ine±cient privatization process.
14Long-term performance data prior to privatization helps reveal underlying characteristics of the ¯rm under
government ownership, whereas long-term performance data after privatization helps tell how the external
environment, such as the product market for example, evolves after privatization takes place. Notice that
because the product market development a®ects all ¯rms, cross-section data is unlikely to pick up such an
e®ect.
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Figure 5: Premature privatization without Assumption 3
The possibility that the ¯rm is privatized prematurely has to with Assumption 3, which
guarantees the monotonicity of PDV g(t;1) ¡ PDV p(t) for t ¸ ts (see the proof of Lemma
9). A natural question is how restrictive this assumption is, or more precisely, what happens
if PDV g(t;1) ¡ PDV p(t) fails to observe the monotonicity for t ¸ ts.
Figure 5 illustrates a situation where PDV g(t;1) ¡ PDV p(t) is not monotonic after ts
and privatization becomes feasible again at t0
11 > ts. As Figure 5 shows, had privatization
not taken place at t0
11, it would then take place at ¿ at the price sp. The curve connecting sp
and s¤ represents the stream of subgame perfect privatization prices the government agency
would o®er after ¿. Naturally, as long as t0
11 is su±ciently large, privatization at t11 instead
can make both the government agency and the manager better o®. In this sense, the results
presented in Proposition 6 are qualitatively robust. In fact, using the same intuition that I
will develop in the next section, I can show that the possibility to privatize the ¯rm at t0
11
could actually induce the government agency and the manager to agree to privatize the ¯rm
even prior to t11.
6 Full Privatization v.s. Partial Privatization
The foregoing analysis focuses on full privatization under the manager's wealth constraint.
While ¯nancial underdevelopment in transition economies (Berglof and Bolton 2003) may
prevent the manager from raising money from outsiders, some ¯nancial arrangement can be
made between the government agency and the manager to relieve the constraint. One of
such arrangements is partial privatization. Indeed, partial privatization has been viewed as
a \second best" instrument when buyers are wealth constrained. My analysis in this section
examines this proposition. The key insight I will derive is that partial privatization may be
used by the government agency as an o®-equilibrium threat point to enhance its bargaining
25power during full privatization, and that such an increase in bargaining power has both
redistributive as well as e±ciency implications when the manager are wealth constrained.
To do so, I extend the dynamic model as follows. At any point in time, the government
agency can choose either full privatization or partial privatization. Denote by ¯, ¯ 2 f0;¸g,
the choice between full privatization (¯ = 0) and partial privatization (¯ = ¸). The govern-
ment agency retains ¸ share of the investment return but relinquishes its control rights after
partial privatization. I refer to a ¯rm as fully private owned after it is fully privatized, and one
as partially private owned vice versa. I use ¯ = 0 to index variables for a fully private owned
¯rm and ¯ = ¸ to index those for a partially private owned ¯rm. For example, PDV p(t;¸)
will be the long-term payo® for the government agency at t when the ¯rm is partially private
owned at that time. Similarly, PDW g(t;t0;0) will be the long-term payo® for the manager
at t if the ¯rm is under government ownership at t but is to become fully private owned at
t0. When it is not indexed by ¯, a variable either corresponds to the previous analysis where
partial privatization is not considered as an option, or is independent of whether the ¯rm is
fully or partially privatized.
To simplify the discussion, I make the following assumption:
Assumption 4 a) c(e) = ce2, c > 0;
b) w
p
0(¸)[R1(ap(¸)) ¡ c(ap(¸)) ¡ w
p
0(¸)] > w
p
0(0)[R1(ap(0)) ¡ c(ap(0)) ¡ w
p
0(0)]:
This assumption guarantees that the government agency always prefers a partially pri-
vatized owned ¯rm to one that is fully privatized owned. This further implies that partial
privatization remains feasible beyond the \end point" for full privatization. In addition, this
assumption implies that the di®erence in the government agency's payo®s between a partially
privatized ¯rm and a fully-privatized one is increasing over time. The next lemma summarizes
these implications.
Lemma 10 Suppose Assumption 4 holds. Then
a) V p(t;¸) > V p(t;0) for any t;
b) t11(¸) > t11(0);; and
c) V p(t;¸) ¡ V p(t;0) is increasing in t.
Finally, note that Assumption 3 and 2 hold when the cost function c(e) is quadratic.
6.1 Partial privatization as a bargaining chip
To show how the possibility of partial privatization helps strengthens the bargaining posi-
tion of the government agency, I divide my ensuing analysis into two scenarios. In the ¯rst,
26benchmark scenario, the government agency always prefers partial privatization to full priva-
tization. In the second one, which is the scenario my analysis will focus on, the government
agency ¯nds itself better o® to fully privatize the ¯rm at some point.
I begin with the benchmark scenario. The notion that \the government agency always
prefers partial privatization to full privatization" will be precisely de¯ned later, but loosely
speaking, it means the following: At any t, if the government agency were to fully privatize
the ¯rm at that point, there exists a later point in time, ¿ ¸ t, at which the government
agency is better o® to partially privatize the ¯rm at ¿ than to fully privatize the ¯rm at t. I
restrict my attention to ¿ ¸ t to maintain subgame perfection.
Denote by ts(¸) the point where
Sp(ts(¸);¸) = Sg(ts(¸)):
ts(¸) is therefore the \second best" timing for partially privatization. Naturally, ts(¸) > ts,
for full privatization yields a larger amount of social surplus than partial privatization for all
t. Applying my previous analysis (see Proposition 4 and 5), I can conclude that the ¯rm will
be partially privatized at ts(¸) in this scenario, provided that the wealth constraint is not
binding in type I for partial privatization at ts(¸), a condition I assume to hold in order to
simplify the discussion.
Assumption 5 s¤ ¸ PDV g(ts(¸);1) ¡ PDV p(ts(¸);¸):
I now turn to the second scenario. To de¯ne this scenario precisely, notice ¯rst that
partial privatization remains implementable after full privatization is no longer feasible (i.e.,
t11(¸) > t11(0)). In other words, ownership transformation would eventually take the form of
partial privatization. This implies that if the government agency implements full privatization
in a subgame perfect equilibrium, the manager must be better o® to accept full privatization
than to agree to partial privatization.
To maintain subgame perfection, I therefore restrict my attention to t such that full pri-
vatization Pareto dominates partial privatization. Notice, however, that given Assumption
4, the government agency would never choose to partially privatize the ¯rm prior to ts(¸).
Therefore, to be more precise, I will focus on t such that full privatization at t Pareto domi-
nates partial privatization at maxft;ts(¸)g. De¯ne t0
0 as the new \starting point" where full
privatization begins to dominate partial privatization at ts(¸),
PDV p(t0
0;0) + PDW p(t0
0;0) = PDV g(t0
0;ts(¸);¸) + PDWg(t0
0;ts(¸);¸):
Lemma 11 Suppose that Assumption 1 and 4 hold. t0
0 2 (t0;ts(0)). Furthermore, full priva-
tization is feasible and Pareto dominates partial privatization at t if and only if t 2 [t0
0;t11(0)]
27in the following sense:
PDV p(t;0) + PDWp(t;0) > PDV g(t;ts(¸);¸) + PDW g(t;ts(¸);¸) for t 2 (t0
0;ts(¸));
PDV p(t;0) + PDW p(t;0) > PDV p(t;¸) + PDW p(t;¸) for t 2 [ts(¸);t11(0)].
I divide [t0
0;t11(0)] into two time intervals: [t0
0;ts(¸)) and [ts(¸);t11(0)]. In the ¯rst time
interval, the government agency may ¯nd it better o® to privatize at t instead of maintaining
government ownership and partially privatizing the ¯rm at ts(¸). This happens when the
following condition holds
s¤ ¸ PDV g(t;ts(¸);¸) ¡ PDV p(t;0) for some t 2 [t0
0;ts(¸)): (18)
In condition (18), · sp(t;¸) denote the incentive compatible price at which the ¯rm would be
partially privatized. In the second time interval, the government agency may ¯nd itself in
favor of full privatization instead of partial privatization at the same point of time. This
happens under the condition:
s¤ ¸ PDV p(t;¸) ¡ PDV p(t;0) + · sp(t;¸); for some t 2 [ts(¸);t11(0)]: (19)
Condition (18) and (19) imply the existence of prices a®ordable to the manager such that
the government agency will be better o® to fully privatize the ¯rm at t. Given the fact
that t 2 [t0
0;t11(0)], one of such prices can also make the manager better o®. Accordingly,
had privatization not taken place by t, full privatization would take place at t despite the
possibility of partial privatization. Furthermore, once full privatization were to be chosen at t
over partial privatization, partial privatization would never be chosen at any ¿ 2 [t0
0;t). This
is simply because full privatization Pareto dominates partial privatization for any ¿ 2 [t0
0;t)
(see Lemma 11).
Condition (18) and (19) thus de¯ne the two scenarios I analyze here.
De¯nition 1 The government agency is said to always prefer partial privatization to full
privatization if neither condition (18) nor condition (19) holds. Vice versa, the government
agency is said to prefer full privatization to partial privatization at some point if either of
these two conditions holds.
De¯ne tf as the largest point in time that satis¯es either condition (18) or condition (19).
tf is therefore the point in time beyond which partial privatization will take over. I can draw
the following conclusion:
Proposition 7 Suppose Assumption 1, 4, and 5 hold. When the government agency can
choose either full or partial privatization, the following happens:
28a) the ¯rm will be fully privatized at minftf;ts(0)g if either condition (18) or condition (19)
holds; and
b) the ¯rm will be partially privatized at ts(¸) otherwise.
Proposition 6 states that, despite the possibility of partial privatization, the ¯rm will
continue to be fully privatized as long as either condition (18) or (19) is satis¯ed and that the
¯rm will be (fully) privatized prematurely if and only if condition (18) holds prior to ts(0) but
not after and condition (19) does not hold. Part (a) of this proposition is illustrated in Figure
6. The upper panel of this ¯gure demonstrates a situation where tf > ts(0), and the lower
panel indicates one where tf < ts(0). In both panels, the bold curves represent the streams
of subgame perfect prices ~ sp(t;¯) if the ¯rm were to privatize at t, either fully (¯ = 0) or
partially (¯ = ¸).
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Figure 6: Full privatization with partial privatization possible
In the upper panel of Figure 6, the bold vertical lines AB and CD indicate the gains
from full privatization and that from partial privatization for the government agency at tf.
AB = CD because at tf, the government agency is indi®erent between full and partial
privatization. In this case, the government agency begins to o®er full privatization at ts(0),
29and continues to do so until tf at the price ~ sp(t;0), were the ¯rm not privatized. After
tf, if the ¯rm were still not privatized, the government agency would start to o®er partial
privatization at the price ~ sp(t;¸). In equilibrium, the manager accepts the privatization o®er
at ts(0).
In the lower panel of this ¯gure, the gains for the government agency from partial pri-
vatization at ts(¸) is represented by the bold vertical line AB. The bold vertical line CD
measures the corresponding gains from full privatization at tf. CD equals AB with proper
discounting,15 that is, the government agency is indi®erent between full privatization at tf
and waiting to partially privatize the ¯rm at ts(¸). In this case, the government agency of-
fers full privatization at the price s¤ at tf. If rejected, the government agency will keep its
ownership of the ¯rm until ts(¸) upon which it would start to o®er partial privatization at
the price of ~ sp(t;¸). In equilibrium, the manager accepts the o®er at tf.
As Figure 6 illustrates, the possibility of partial privatization helps increase the bargaining
power of the government agency under full privatization. In this ¯gure, the lighter curve ~ sp(t)
indicates the stream of privatization prices when partial privatization is not possible. In both
the upper panel as well as the lower panel, the government agency grabs more gains from
privatization with the possibility of partial privatization than without (EF > GF in the
upper panel and EF > GH with proper discounting in the lower panel).
More generally, when either condition (18) or (19) holds, the government agency would
charge s¤ for the ¯rm at tf if the ¯rm had not been privatized at that point. Since tf <
t11(0),16 and since the marginal rate of the price change (i.e.,
d~ s
p(t)
dt ) is the same both with the
possibility of partial privatization and without, the gains accruing to the government agency
from full privatization must be at least as large with the possibility of partial privatization as
without.
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumption 1 and 4 hold. Suppose in addition that either condition
(18) or (19) is satis¯ed. Then the government agency receives at least as much gains from
full privatization with the possibility of partial privatization as without. And it receives more
15Condition (18) holds in equality at tf and therefore can be rewritten as:
s¤ = PDV g(tf;ts(¸);¸) ¡ PDV p(tf;0) ¡ (PDV g(tf;1) ¡ PDV g(tf;1)
= PDV g(tf;1) ¡ PDV p(tf;0) + PDV g(tf;ts(¸);¸) ¡ PDV g(tf;1)
= PDV g(tf;1) ¡ PDV p(tf;0) + e¡r(tf¡ts(¸))(PDV p(ts(¸);¸) + ~ sp(ts(¸)) ¡ PDV g(ts(¸);1)):
In other words, PDV p(tf;0) + s¤ ¡ PDV g(tf;1) = e¡r(tf¡ts(¸))(PDV p(ts(¸);¸) + ~ sp(ts(¸)) ¡
PDV g(ts(¸);1)).
16By the de¯nition tf, I have (following condition (18)):
s¤ = PDV g(tf;ts(¸);¸) ¡ PDV p(tf;0)
> PDV g(tf;1) ¡ PDV p(tf;0):
30gains from full privatization if tf < t1(0).
6.2 Is partial privatization second best?
As argued earlier, partial privatization helps relax the wealth constraint of the manager and
make otherwise infeasible ownership transformation feasible. Thus, when full privatization is
never feasible, partial privatization will take place at ts(¸) that is constrained e±cient, as long
as Assumption 5 holds. In this sense, partial privatization is the \second best" alternative in
the presence of a wealth constraint.
However, as I will show next, the sheer possibility of partial privatization can also induce
further e±ciency loss. The additional e±ciency loss takes place in three forms. The ¯rst
form is highlighted in the lower panel of Figure 6. The ¯rm continues to be fully privatized
in equilibrium yet the equilibrium timing becomes ine±cient when partial privatization be-
comes possible (i.e., te = ts whereas te(¯) = tf < ts(0)). In the second form, the ¯rm is
privatized prematurely at t11(0) < ts(0) (see Proposition 6) without the possibility of partial
privatization. When partial privatization becomes possible, the ¯rm continues to be fully
privatized but the equilibrium timing pushes further ahead at tf . Since tf < t11 and since
government ownership dominates private ownership prior to ts(0), earlier privatization re-
duces social surplus. In the third form, the ¯rm is partially privatized in equilibrium at ts(¸)
with the option of partial privatization, whereas without such an option, the ¯rm is fully
privatized at minft11;ts(0)g. If t11 > t0
0, then by the de¯nition of t0
0, the long-term social
surplus generated under full privatization will be larger than that generated under partial
privatization.
The next corollary highlights the possibility for the ¯rst and the third form e±ciency
loss. The corollary follows that indicates the likelihood for the second and the third form of
e±ciency loss.
Corollary 2 Suppose that Assumption 1, 4, and 5 hold and that
PDV g(ts(0);ts(¸);¸) > PDV p(ts(0);0):
Then there exists s¤ such that the ¯rm is fully privatized at the e±cient timing ts(0) without
the option of partial privatization, but will not otherwise.
Corollary 3 Suppose Assumption 1, 4, and 5 hold and that
PDV g(ts(0);ts(¸);¸) > PDV p(ts(0);0):
Then there exists s¤ such that the ¯rm is fully privatized at t11 2 (t0
0;ts(0)) without the option
of partial privatization, but is either fully privatized before t11 or partially privatized at ts(¸)
31when the option is available.
Why does the possibility of partial privatization induce further e±ciency loss in ownership
transformation? Interestingly, the additional e±ciency loss is rooted in the fact that the man-
ager has limited wealth. Ceteris paribus, the government agency prefers a partially privatized
¯rm to a fully privatized one. Therefore, the ability to partially privatize the ¯rm shifts the
government agency's threat point in its favor during bargaining over full privatization. Such
a shift allows the government agency to be more demanding for the transfer payment from
the manager. Given that the manager has the limited wealth, additional e±ciency loss thus
ensues. This analysis thus serves as a cautionary reminder that partial privatization may not
be a \second best" instrument for ownership transformation in the presence of buyers' wealth
constraints.
7 Conclusion
The analysis in this paper is placed within the context of transition from central planning to
market economy. It focuses on an institutional setting characterized by government failure
on the one hand and a gradually developing product market on the other. With such an
institutional setting in mind, I examined the trade-o® between government ownership and
private ownership and used such a trade-o® to understand privatization from both a normative
and a positive perspective. My analysis centered on the privatization of small-medium sized
¯rms designed to empower insiders, in particular the management, and stop government
intervention. By highlighting the many implications of the buyers' (i.e., the manager's) limited
wealth on the privatization process, this analysis was able to shed lights on our existing
understanding of privatization processes.
7.1 Application to China
To ¯nd the application of my analysis in real life, consider the experience of China over the last
two decades. During the ¯rst decade of its economic reform, the Chinese experience seems to
refute the conventional wisdom that government ownership is less e±cient than private own-
ership and hence privatization is imperative. Shortly after it began economic reforms in the
late 70's, China witnessed a rapid emergence of local government-owned enterprises, mostly
in rural areas, known as township-village enterprises (TVEs). These enterprises spearheaded
a remarkable growth of the economy in the following decade and subsequently changed the
landscape of China's economy that was once dominated by state-owned ¯rms.17 The share
of these enterprises in the national industrial output increased from 9 percent in 1978 to 27
17See Byrd and Lin (1990) and Che and Qian (1998a) for more detailed descriptions of these enterprises.
32percent in 1993 (China Statistics Yearbook, 1994). During the same period of time, however,
the development of private enterprises remained insigni¯cant. By 1993 the private sector
accounted for only about 12 percent of national industrial output.
Despite the early divergence, the recent Chinese experience appears to be converging to
the global trend of privatization. Since mid 90's, local government-owned ¯rms began a
quiet and yet massive privatization, and by year 2000, more than 80 percent of TVEs had
undertaken some form of privatization (China Rural Enterprise Yearbook 2001). By year 2000,
the government share in the total assets of rural industrial ¯rms (de¯ned in China as including
both rural private ¯rms and TVEs) was around 40 percent, dropped by 6 percent in a single
year, whereas the share of private investors (both domestic and foreign) reached 34 percent.18
Meanwhile the private sector expanded rapidly. Private ¯rms were reportedly to be solely
responsible for the growth in the sales revenue and the value added of rural enterprises for the
year 2000 (China Rural Enterprise Yearbook 2001). The share of private ¯rms in the national
industrial output had jumped from 12 percent in 1993 to 34 percent in 1998. By 1998, 33
percent of GDP were contributed by private ¯rms (International Finance Corporation 2000).
All these have happened while an adequate system of checks and balances continues to
be absent from the Chinese political landscape. Without fundamental political reform in
China, corruption has become \endemic" (Transition Newsletter 1995) during the process of
economic liberalization and ¯scal decentralization, despite continued e®orts by the central
government to crack down corruption committed by local government o±cials (Li 2002). The
1999 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index ranked the degree of corruption
in China in the same group as that in Belarus and Mexico, falling far behind other transi-
tion and developing economies such as Hungary, Czech Republic, Namibia, or South Africa
(http://www.transparency.org/cpi/1999/cpi1999.html).
Meanwhile, beginning from virtual non-existence, product markets developed quickly in
China. This development helped drive the evolution of ownership structures in the non-state
sector. When economic reforms ¯rst took place in China during the late 70's and early 80's,
a signi¯cant portion of resources were still allocated through government command (Lin etc
1996). In rural areas, local government authorities controlled, or had better access to, products
that are essential for ¯rm operations (Chang and Wang 1994, Che and Qian 1998a).19 Many
have attributed government ownership of these rural industrial enterprises to the control by
18Chen and Rozelle (1999), Brandt, Li, and Roberts (2001), and Sun (2002) also documented the privati-
zation trend among TVEs.
19The early product market development in China was characterized by the so-called dual-track system
(Lau, Qian, and Roland 2000). The dual track system was a hybrid resource allocation mechanism under
which transitional central planning (the plan track) and the emerging product market (the market track)
co-existed. Products in the plan track were arti¯cially underpriced whereas products in the market track were
transacted at market clearing prices. While ¯rms in the non-state sector were mostly precluded from the
plan track, they had often bene¯ted from o±cial diversion conducted by government o±cials who diverted
the in-plan resources under their control to the market track (Li 2002).
33local authorities over \critical inputs" (Chang and Wang 1994, Naughton 1994, Che and
Qian 1998a). After a decade of e®orts, however, China made signi¯cant strides in liberalizing
product markets during the last two decades. By 1990, there were still about 64 percent of
intermediate products in China that were government regulated. However, just ¯ve years
later, more than 80 percent of intermediate products were placed through markets (Tenev,
Zhang, and Brefort 2002). Several authors have noted that the role of local government-owned
enterprises has become less prominent in areas with better developed product markets (Jin
and Qian 1998, Chen and Rozselle 1999).
Much of the privatization taking place within China's non-state sector involves de facto
management buy-outs (Chen and Rozelle 1999, Brandt, Li, and Roberts 2000). The pattern is
mostly a result of the fact that these enterprises are relatively small in size and highly localized.
It is also because over the years of their development, these ¯rms have grown dependent on the
existing managerial talents, which are relatively scarce in China's rural society. Withstanding
the product market development, the ¯nancial system remains underdeveloped in China.
To date, four state-owned banks continue to dominate China's ¯nancial sector with an 80
percent of market share (Bonin 1999). A decade since its inception, the equity market remains
dysfunctional, ¯nancing merely 2 percent of investment in 2001 (Economist 2003). Although
the private sector contributes to more than 30 percent of GDP, the share of working capital
loans from banks and other ¯nancial institutions outstanding to the private sector was still
less than 1 percent by the end of 1998 (International Finance Corporation 2000). Indeed,
researches haver found private ¯rms to be discriminated by state-owned banks in their lending
policies (Brandt and Li 2002).
Limited research has been done with respect to the post-privatization performance of
these ¯rms. A few existing empirical works seem to con¯rm what my analysis has revealed.
For instance, Sonobe and Otsuka (2003) showed that, while the productivity of TVEs were
signi¯cantly improved after recent privatization, such improvement came only after a few
years after privatization. The same phenomenon was documented by Li and Rozelle (2000).
7.2 Some possible extensions
This paper analyzes a rich set of questions concerning government and private ownership
as well as those related to privatization. However, due to the space limit, I am not able
to elaborate on several issues that some readers may ¯nd interesting. Take the case where
only full privatization is allowed for example, one can show that, the more likely does the
government agency hold a laissez-faire attitude towards the business (i.e., when ° is larger),
the more likely will privatization take place prematurely. This is because a larger ° increases
the social surplus under government ownership on the one hand, and makes government
ownership more attractive to the government agency on the other. Both factors tend to make
34it more likely that the wealth constraint is binding in type I at ts. One can also show that,
the faster the product market develops, the more likely will it be for the wealth constraint to
be binding in type I. This implies that there is a trade-o® in the product market development.
A faster product market development means that privatization ought to take place earlier,
but it also means that the timing of privatization will more likely to be ine±cient, given the
presence of buyers' wealth constraints.
This paper has considered only the scheme of insider privatization, in particular, privatiz-
ing the ¯rm to the manager. I justify this focus by assuming that the manager is indispensable
to the ¯rm. Nevertheless, even under such a circumstance, it may still make sense for the
government agency to sell the ¯rm to rich outsiders as a way to circumvent the manager's
wealth constraint. Given the space limit, I did not examine such an alternative, although I
believe this is an interesting topic that is worth pursuing. In particular, privatizing to out-
siders is likely to be followed with further ownership transformation, when the management is
indispensable to the ¯rm and remains the factor to be motivated. That is, after they acquire
the ¯rm from the government, outsiders may negotiate with the management and transfer
ownership rights to the management. Addressing the issue of outsider privatization in this
context may therefore help highlight the following question in the spirit of Coase: Does to
whom the ¯rm is initially privatized matter?
35Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Given Lemma 1, the proof of the existence of a separating equilibrium and that of uniqueness
(using the intuitive criterion test) are standard. What I will focus on in this proof is the claim that
B
g(µh) < B
g(µl). To see this, notice that in a separating equilibrium, the following truth-telling
constraint for the µl type must hold: v
g(a
g
1(½ = 0);B
g(µl)jµl) ¸ v
g(a
g
1(½ = 1);B
g(µh)jµl); or
(1 ¡ ¸)R1(a
g
1(½ = 0)jµl) + B
g(µl) ¸ (1 ¡ ¸)R1(a
g
1(½ = 1)jµl) + B
g(µh): (20)
Since the ex post managerial e®ort is increasing in ½, (1¡¸)R1(a
g
1(½ = 0)jµl) < (1¡¸)R1(a
g
1(½ = 1)jµl):
I therefore have B
g(µl) > B
g(µh):
Proof of Proposition 1 I have shown (see equation (1)) that the government agency exploits fully
its bargaining power under private ownership and the manager obtains no rents. In this proof, I show
that the government agency will not do so under government ownership when µ = µh and hence
w
g
1(½ = 1) > ¹w
g
0(½ = 1):
To see this, notice that in the separating equilibrium, the individual rationality constraints for
the manager when µ = µh and when µ = µl are
w
g
1(½ = 1) ¸ ¹w
g
0(½ = 1); and w
g
1(½ = 0) ¸ ¹w
g
0(½ = 0);
respectively, where
w
g
1(½ = 1) = ¸R1(a
g
1(½ = 1)jµh) ¡ c(a
g
1(½ = 1)) ¡ B
g(µh);
w
g
1(½ = 0) = ¸R1(a
g
1(½ = 0)jµl) ¡ c(a
g
1(½ = 0)) ¡ B
g(µl);
w
g
0(½ = 1) = ¸R0(a
g
0(½ = 1)jµh) ¡ c(a
g
0(½ = 1)); and
w
g
0(½ = 0) = ¸R0(a
g
0(½ = 0)jµl) ¡ c(a
g
0(½ = 0))
are the ex post payo®s of the manager under the posterior belief ½ when the product is either acquired
from the government agency or from the market. Therefore, w
g
1(½ = 1) > ¹w
g
0(½ = 1) if and only if:
B
g(µh) < ¸R1(a
g
1(½ = 1)jµh) ¡ c(a
g
1(½ = 1)) ¡ ¹[¸R0(a
g
0(½ = 1)jµh) ¡ c(a
g
0(½ = 1))]: (21)
I use contradiction to show that condition (21) holds. Notice that the government-regulated
product, the laissez-faire attitude of the government agency, and the ex post managerial e®ort are all
complements to each other (Assumption 1). Hence, I have:
¸R1(a
g
1(½ = 1)jµh) ¡ c(a
g
1(½ = 1)) ¡ [¸R1(a
g
1(½ = 0)jµl) ¡ c(a
g
1(½ = 0))]
> ¸R0(a
g
0(½ = 1)jµh) ¡ c(a
g
1(½ = 1)) ¡ [¸R0(a
g
0(½ = 0)jµl) ¡ c(a
g
0(½ = 0))]:
36In other words,
¸R1(a
g
1(½ = 1)jµh) ¡ c(a
g
1(½ = 1)) ¡ ¹[¸R0(a
g
0(½ = 1)jµh) ¡ c(a
g
1(½ = 1))]
> ¸R1(a
g
1(½ = 0)jµl) ¡ c(a
g
1(½ = 0)) ¡ ¹[¸R0(a
g
0(½ = 0)jµl) ¡ c(a
g
0(½ = 0))]: (22)
Since the individual rationality constraint is binding when µ = µl in the separating equilibrium,
B
g(µl) = ¸R1(a
g
1(½ = 0)jµl) ¡ c(a
g
1(½ = 0)) ¡ ¹[¸R0(a
g
0(½ = 0)jµl) ¡ c(a
g
0(½ = 0))]: (23)
Therefore, if condition (21) does not hold, it would imply (in conjunction with condition (22) and (23))
that B
g(µh) > B
g(µl), contradicting to Lemma 2. I therefore conclude: w
g
1(½ = 1) > ¹w
g
0(½ = 1):
Proof of Lemma 3
Let S
g(e) and S
p(e) denote the social surplus as a function of the ex ante managerial e®ort e
under government ownership and under private ownership respectively:
S
p(e) = e(R1(a
p) ¡ c(a
p)) ¡ c(e);
S
g(e) = e[°R1(a
g(½ = 1)jµh) ¡ c(a
g(½ = 1)) + (1 ¡ °)R1(a
g(½ = 0)jµl) ¡ c(a
g(½ = 0))] ¡ c(e):
By the de¯nitions of S
g and S
p, S
g = S
g(e
g) and S
p = S
p(e
p). Because private ownership is more
e±cient than government ownership ex post, these two social surplus functions satisfy a single-crossing
property:
@S
p(e)=@e > @S
g(e)=@e (24)
for all e and S
p(e) = S
g(e) if and only if e = 0: These observations are illustrated in the next ¯gure.
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Figure 7: Social Surplus under Private and Government Ownership
Given the strict convexity of c(e), both S
g(e) and S
p(e) are strictly concave in e. Furthermore,
both e
p and e
g, fall short of the second best e®ort levels that maximize S
g(e) and S
p(e) respectively;
in other words, both @S
p(e
p)=@e and @S
g(e
g)=@e are positive. Therefore, S
g > S
p only if government
ownership improves ex ante managerial incentives signi¯cantly, or e
g > e
p as shown in Figure 7.
37Proof of Lemma 4
The ¯rst order conditions for e
g and e
p are:
dc(e
g)
de
= °w
g
1(½ = 1) + °w
g
1(½ = 0); and
dc(e
p)
de
= w
p
1
respectively. Following equation (1), I have:
@e
p
@¹
=
w
p
0
d2c=dep2: (25)
Using the de¯nitions of w
g
1(½ = 1) and w
g
1(½ = 0) (see the proof of Proposition1), I also have:
@e
g
@¹
=
@[¡°B
g(µh) ¡ (1 ¡ °)B
g(µl)]
@¹
=
d
2c
dep2
=
@[¡°(B
g(µh) ¡ B
g(µl)) ¡ B
g(µl)]
@¹
=
d
2c
dep2: (26)
In a sequential equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion test, the truth-telling condition for µl
type is binding. That is, condition (20) holds in equality, implying:
B
g(µh) ¡ B
g(µl) = (1 ¡ ¸)R1(a
g
1(½ = 0)jµl) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)R1(a
g
1(½ = 1)jµl): (27)
Substituting (27) and (23) into (26), I have:
@e
g
@¹
=
w
g
0(½ = 0)
d2c=dep2 : (28)
Comparing (25) and (28), I note that w
g
0(½ = 0) < w
p
0. Furthermore, given Assumption 2,
@
2c=@(e
g)
2 ¸ @
2c=@(e
p)
2 when e
p · e
g. Therefore , I conclude: @e
g=@¹ < @e
p=@¹ when e
g ¸ e
p.
Proof of Proposition 2
I show ¯rst that
@Sp
@¹ >
@Sg
@¹ for ¹
s such that S
p(¹
s) = S
g(¹
s). Notice that these derivatives
can be written as
@Sg
@¹ =
@Sg
@eg
@eg
@¹ ,
@Sp
@¹ =
@Sp
@ep
@ep
@¹ . I evaluate these derivatives at ¹ = ¹
s. Since
S
p(¹
s) = S
g(¹
s), e
p(¹
0) < e
g(¹
0) (Lemma 3) and hence
@ep
@¹ >
@eg
@¹ (Lemma 4). Furthermore, given
the single-crossing property (24) of the social surplus functions under the two ownership forms and
the concavity of the social surplus functions, I have:
@S
p
@ep >
@S
p
@eg >
@S
g
@eg :
Therefore,
@Sp
@¹ >
@Sg
@¹ at ¹ = ¹
s.
Next, I show that there exists ¹
s such that S
p(¹
s) = S
g(¹
s). This is simply because that S
g > S
p
if ¹ = 0 and that S
p > S
g, if ¹ = 1.
Proof of Lemma 6
Di®erentiating W
p ¡ W
g with respect to ¹ and using the envelope theorem, I have:
@W
p=@¹ ¡ @W
g=@¹ = e
p@w
p
1
@¹
¡ e
g @[°w
g
1(½ = 1) + (1 ¡ °)w
g
1(½ = 0)]
@¹
:
38Using the de¯nitions of w
g
1(½ = 1) and w
g
1(½ = 0) (see the proof of Proposition1), I have:
@[°w
g
1(½ = 1) + (1 ¡ °)w
g
1(½ = 0)]
@¹
=
@[¡°B
g(µh) ¡ (1 ¡ °)B
g(µl)]
@¹
Following the proof of Lemma 4, I have:
@[¡°B
g(µh) ¡ (1 ¡ °)B
g(µl)]
@¹
= w
g
0(½ = 0):
Meanwhile,
@w
p
1
@¹ = w
p
0 according to equation (1). Since e
p ¸ e
g and w
p
0 > w
g
0(½ = 0), I conclude
@W
p=@¹ ¡ @W
g=@¹ > 0:
Proof of Lemma 8
The necessary part of the claim is based on the fact that condition (5) is derived by combining
condition (4) and condition (3) together.
For the su±cient part, I show ¯rst that privatization Pareto dominates no privatization at t if
and only if t ¸ t0. Naturally, this is true when t ¸ t
s. For t 2 [t0;t
s), notice that because t0 < t
s,
S
p(t0) < S
g(t0). Since
d(PDW
p(t0) + PDV
p(t0))
dt
= r(PDW
p(t0) + PDV
p(t0)) ¡ S
p(t0) and
d(PDW
g(t0;1) + PDV
p(t0;1))
dt
= r(PDW
g(t0;1) + PDV
p(t0;1)) ¡ S
g(t0);
I have
d(PDWp(t0)+PDV p(t0))
dt >
d(PDWg(t0;1)+PDV p(t0;1))
dt . Further induction then establishes that
PDW
p(t) + PDV
p(t) ¸ PDW
g(t;1) + PDV
g(t;1) for t 2 [t0;t
s].
Since privatization can take place only if it Pareto dominates no privatization, the observation
above implies that privatization can take place only after t0. Conditional on t ¸ t0, it is easy to show
that there exists s
p(t) that satis¯es (2), (3), and (4) when condition (5) holds.
Proof of Lemma 9
The ¯rst part of this proposition follows from the fact that for t ¸ t0,
PDW
p(t) + PDV
p(t) ¸ PDW
g(t;1) + PDV
g(t;1):
The second and the third part are derived from the same logic, since W
p(t)¡W
g(t) has the property
that it is increasing in t for all t ¸ t
s such that W
p(t) > W
g(t) (Lemma 6). To avoid repetition, I
therefore prove only the third part.
Notice ¯rst that
d(PDV g(t;1)¡PDV p(t))
dt = r(PDV
g(t;1) ¡ PDV
p(t)) ¡ (V
g(t) ¡ V
p(t)). The
derivative is positive at t if V
g(t) · V
p(t) (PDV
g(t;1) ¡ PDV
p(t) > 0 since by assumption the
wealth constraint is binding in type I at t). If V
g(t) > V
p(t) instead, then by the assumption that
V
g(t) ¡ V
p(t) is increasing in t for all t ¸ t
s such that V
g(t) > V
p(t), I have:
r(PDV
g(t;1) ¡ PDV
p(t)) > V
g(t) ¡ V
p(t):
39Therefore, the derivative is positive as well. Since
d(PDV g(t;1)¡PDV p(t))
dt > 0 for all t ¸ t
s, the wealth
constraint is binding in type I for any ¿ > t when it is binding in type I at t ¸ t
s.
Proof of Lemma 10
Whether the ¯rm is partially or fully privatized, the government agency will no longer restrain
itself from rent seeking when dealing with such a ¯rm. Accordingly, all the ex post rents accrue to
the government agency through the illicit fee. Therefore,
V
p(t;¯) = e
p(t;¯)[R1(a
p(¯)) ¡ c(a
p(¯)) ¡ w
p
0(¯)]:
When c(e) is quadratic, e
p(t;¯) = argmaxe[e¹(t)w
p
0(¯) ¡ c(e)] is linear in ¹(t)w
p
0(¯). Therefore,
given part a) of Assumption 4, V
p(t;¸) > V
p(t;0) if and only if part b) of Assumption 4 holds. That
V
p(t;¸) > V
p(t;0) for any t in turn implies the second claim: t11(¸) > t11(0). The last claim of this
lemma is derived from part b) of Assumption 4 and the fact that, when c(e) is quadratic,
d(V
p(t;¸) ¡ V
p(t;0))
dt
=
d¹
dt
fw
p
0(¸)[R1(a
p(¸)) ¡ c(a
p(¸)) ¡ w
p
0(¸)] ¡ w
p
0(0)[R1(a
p(0)) ¡ c(a
p(0)) ¡ w
p
0(0)]g:
Proof of Lemma 11
First, I show that t
0
0 < t
s(0). This is because (1) at t
s(0) it is socially optimal for the ¯rm to
transform from government ownership to a fully privatized one and (2) a fully privatized ¯rm always
generates a larger social surplus than a partially privatized ¯rm. Therefore at t
s(0) transforming
government ownership to a fully privatized one must dominate keeping the ¯rm under government
ownership till t
s(¸) and then transforming it to a partially privatized ¯rm.
Next, I show that t
0
0 > t0. To see this, notice that because t
0
0 < t
s(0) and therefore S
p(t
0
0) <
S
g(t
0
0), I have:
d(PDV
p(t
0
0;0) + PDW
p(t
0
0;0))
dt
>
d(PDV
g(t
0
0;t
s(¸);¸) + PDW
g(t
0
0;t
s(¸))
dt
:
In addition, for any t < t
s(¸),
PDV
p(t;t
s(¸);¸) + PDW
p(t;t
s(¸);¸) > PDV
g(t;1) + PDW
g(t;1):
Combining these two observations together, I can conclude that
PDV
p(t
0
0;0) + PDW
p(t
0
0;0) > PDV
g(t
0
0;1) + PDW
g(t
0
0;1);
or t
0
0 > t0.
Since a fully privatized ¯rm always generates more social surplus than a partially privatized one,
it is easy to see that
PDV
p(t;0) + PDW
p(t;0) > PDV
p(t;¸) + PDW
p(t;¸)
40for t 2 [t
s(¸);t11(0)]. Notice that full privatization is not feasible beyond the point t11(0).
Since in addition a fully privatized ¯rm also generates more social surplus than a government
owned ¯rm when t > t
s(0), I have:
PDV
p(t;0) + PDW
p(t;0) > PDV
g(t;t
s(¸);¸) + PDW
g(t;t
s(¸);¸)
for t 2 [t
s(0);t
s(¸)).
To see why full privatization at t Pareto dominates partial privatization at t
s(¸) for t 2 [t
0
0;t
s(0)),
notice that
d(PDV
p(t
0
0;0) + PDW
p(t
0
0;0))
dt
>
d(PDV
g(t
0
0;t
s(¸);¸) + PDW
g(t
0
0;t
s(¸);¸)
dt
as S
p(t
0
0;0) < S
g(t
0
0). Further induction then establishes that
PDV
p(t;0) + PDW
p(t;0) > PDV
g(t;t
s(¸);¸) + PDW
g(t;t
s(¸);¸)
for t 2 (t
0
0;t
s(0)) using the fact that S
p(t;0) < S
g(t) in this case.
Proof of Corollary 2
Without the option of partial privatization, the equilibrium timing of privatization will be e±cient
as long as the wealth constraint is not binding in type I at t
s(0):
s
¤ ¸ PDV
g(t
s(0);1) ¡ PDV
p(t
s(0);0):
With the option of partial privatization, the equilibrium timing will not be at t
s(0) if neither condition
(18) holds for any t 2 [t
s(0);t
s(¸)) nor does condition (19) for any t 2 [t
s(¸);t11(¸)]. That is, for
t 2 [t
s(0);t
s(¸)),
s
¤ < PDV
g(t;t
s(¸);¸) ¡ PDV
p(t;0);
and for t 2 [t
s(¸);t11(¸)],
s
¤ < PDV
p(t;¸) ¡ PDV
p(t;0) + · s
p(t;¸):
To see this, notice ¯rst that because PDV
p(t
s(0);t
s(¸);¸) > PDV
g(t
s(0);1) and PDV
g(t
s(0);t
s(¸);¸)¡
PDV
p(t
s(0);0) > 0, there exists s
¤ > 0 such that:
PDV
g(t
s(0);1) ¡ PDV
p(t
s(0);0) · s
¤ < PDV
g(t
s(0);t
s(¸);¸) ¡ PDV
p(t
s(0);0):
It turns out, as I will show next, that PDV
g(t;t
s(¸);¸)¡PDV
p(t;0) is increasing in t for t ¸ t
s(0).
Accordingly, when s
¤ < PDV
g(t
s(0);t
s(¸);¸) ¡ PDV
p(t
s(0);0),
s
¤ < PDV
g(t
s(0);t
s(¸);¸) ¡ PDV
p(t
s(0);0) for t 2 (t
s(0);t
s(¸))
41I now show that PDV
g(t;t
s(¸);¸) ¡ PDV
p(t;0) is increasing in t for t ¸ t
s(0). Note that
d(PDV
g(t;t
s(¸);¸) ¡ PDV
p(t;0))
dt
= r(PDV
g(t;t
s(¸);¸) ¡ PDV
p(t;0)) ¡ (V
g(t) ¡ V
p(t)):
This derivative, evaluated at t
s(0), is positive as V
p(t
s(0)) > V
g(t
s(0)) and PDV
p(t
s(0);t
s(¸);¸) ¡
PDV
p(t
s(0);0) > 0. To demonstrate that the derivative is also positive for t 2 (t
s(0);t
s(¸)), assume
otherwise. In that case, there would exist ¿ 2 [t
s(0);t
s(¸)) such that the derivative is zero at ¿ but
positive prior to ¿:
r(PDV
p(¿;t
s(¸);¸) ¡ PDV
p(¿;0)) = V
g(¿) ¡ V
p(¿): (29)
Since the derivative is positive prior to ¿ and PDV
p(t
s(0);t
s(¸);¸) ¡ PDV
p(t
s(0);0) > 0; I have
PDV
p(¿;t
s(¸);¸)¡PDV
p(¿;0) > 0 and hence V
g(¿) > V
p(¿) according to equation (29). However,
following part c) of Lemma 10 and the fact that Assumption 3 holds under Assumption 4, one can
conclude from V
g(¿) > V
p(¿) that
r(PDV
g(¿;t
s(¸);¸) ¡ PDV
p(¿;0)) > V
g(¿) ¡ V
p(¿):
This contradicts equation (29). In other words, condition 18 does not hold for t 2 [t
s(0);t
s(¸)].
To show that condition (19) does not hold for t 2 (t
s(¸);t11(¸)], notice ¯rst that PDV
g(t;t
s(¸);¸)¡
PDV
p(t;0) = PDV
p(t;¸) + · s
p(t;¸) ¡ PDV
p(t;0) when t = t
s(¸), and that PDV
p(t;¸) + · s
p(t;¸) ¡
PDV
p(t;0) is increasing in t as well. The monotonicity is derived as:
d(PDV
p(t;¸) + · s
p(t;¸) ¡ PDV
p(t;0))
dt
= r(PDV
p(t;¸) ¡ PDV
p(t;0))
¡(V
p(t;¸) ¡ V
p(t;0)) +
d· s
p(t;¸)
dt
:
Following part c) of Lemma 10, r(PDV
p(t;¸) ¡ PDV
p(t;0)) > V
p(t;¸) ¡ V
p(t;0): Moreover,
d· sp(t;¸)
dt > 0. Therefore,
d(PDV p(t;¸)+· sp(t;¸)¡PDV p(t;0))
dt > 0.
Proof of Corollary 3
Recall that V
p(t) > V
p(t) for t 2 [t(¹
g
1);t
s(0)], where t(¹
g
1) is the point prior to t
s where the
government agency prefers for the ¯rst time a fully privatized ¯rm to a government-owned one
(Proposition ??). Given the assumption that PDV
g(t
s(0);1) ¡ PDV
p(t
s(0);0) > 0, there exists
¿ 2 (t(¹
g
1);t
s(0) such that PDV
g(t;1) ¡ PDV
p(t;0) is increasing in t for t 2 (¿;t
s(0)].
Restricting my attention to t such that t 2 (maxft
0
0;¿g;t
s(0)], I have PDV
g(t;1) ¡ PDV
p(t;0)
increasing in t and full privatization at t to Pareto dominate partial privatization at t
s(¸). Since
PDV
g(t
s(0);1) ¡ PDV
p(t
s(0);0) > 0, there exists s
¤ > 0 such that
s
¤ = PDV
g(t11;1) ¡ PDV
p(t11;0) for some t11 2 (maxft
0
0;¿g;t
s(0)):
In other words, with the option of partial privatization, full privatization is not feasible at t
s(0),
but is feasible at t11 > t
0
0, implying that it dominates partial privatization at t
s(¸). When partial
42privatization is possible, however, there will be no full privatization at t11 since
PDV
g(t11;t
s(¸);¸) ¡ PDV
p(t11;0) > PDV
g(t11;1) ¡ PDV
p(t11;0) = s
¤:
As a result, the ¯rm is either fully privatized prior to t11 or partially privatized at t
s¸. In either case,
it is less e±cient than full privatization at t11.
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